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From the Heights of Metaphysics:
A Reply to Pickering
Yves Gingras
I felt I should reply to Andy Pickering’s short Response to my long Review
of his book; I did not want to leave it uncontested in the literature.1 I will
pick up a couple of points from his comments to indicate just what it is that
he has failed to grasp about my Review. If these points are understood,
then all else falls into place.
Though Pickering writes that my critical remarks ‘form a disconnected
series’ [AP, 307], I think on the contrary that the seven sections of my
Review raised questions about each of the central themes of his book.2 Of
course, for the sake of clarity – and to respect the property of a language
that is written linearly from left to right and from top to bottom – all could
not be ‘mangled’ together, and they were presented in sequence, which
may explain their apparent unconnectedness from Pickering’s ‘point of
view’. So let us briefly recall the content of those sections, answering his
comments along the way.
In the first section, I pointed out that the ‘dialectic of resistance and
accommodation’, which is the central analytical tool proposed in the book,
was reminiscent of Piaget’s theory of knowledge acquisition, but with one
major difference: Piaget was explicitly structural in his analysis (via the
concept of ‘scheme’), whereas Pickering is purely phenomenalist. I thought
a comparison of the two would make clear the limitations of Pickering’s
dialectic, which offers no way (except verbal) to make possible a real
integration of different elements of practice through their incorporation
into a practical scheme of action, which orients (and thus limits) future
action [YG, 319–20]. The second section discussed Pickering’s return to
realism, and showed that his approach was simply a restatement, in a new
language, of classical positions, using terms too loose to effect a ‘renewal’
of the debate. But on these sections, Pickering has nothing to say.
The third section, on agency, again focused on a concept central to
Pickering and followed in detail the way in which this ‘agency’ supposedly
works. I concluded that since things ‘just happened’ (as Pickering writes so
many times in his book), agency was in fact a kind of inertia that just resists
action, instead of acting by itself. For if words have meaning, ‘agency’ must
be more than ‘resistance’. It is in this context that I sketched out the
example of the blind man. I insisted that I thought this discussion purely
metaphysical, but that it could not be passed over, given the importance it
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seemed to have for Pickering. Now, true to his ‘metaphysical turn’, he
devotes most of his Response to this example, although it takes less than
two pages out of sixteen in my Review. Though I used that example, as well
as Otto Sibum’s reconstitution of Joules’ experiment, to talk about the
problem of the persistence of entities in time, which makes Pickering’s
concept of emergence problematic, his comments are limited to repeating
that things really emerge in time. Thus he tells us that before Glaser
embarked upon his project, ‘there were no bubble chambers anywhere’
[AP, 308]. Of course there were none, but the point here is that, as I wrote
in my Review, Pickering again confuses machines, which are composed
objects, and entities, which are not composed; they thus ‘have a distinct
ontological status’ [YG, 326]. And to make things even more complete, I
added [YG, 333, note 12] that ‘effects’ like Hall or Zeeman effects also had
a different ontological status, only to make clear that if one wants to talk
about ontology one should take these differences seriously, or at least argue
against them. This I take to be the kind of confusion that makes Pickering’s
‘metaphysics’ superficial. But in his Response, Pickering chose not to raise
(or to grasp?) those questions, preferring to repeat the obvious: the bubble
chamber did not exist before Glaser, and here is a proof that things emerge
in time . . . .
Section four took up the question of Pickering’s ‘theory of everything’
(TOE). Far from a simple ‘mockery’ [AP, 310, note 2], this section took
seriously Pickering’s writing about ‘cabalos, virinculi, montani’, and other
demons [MP, 243]. By the way, I must note that in the reviews I have seen
of The Mangle, no-one seems to have taken that part seriously: reviewers,
curiously, simply pass over in silence on the concept of ‘non-standard
agency’. As a firm believer in argumentation and in charitable inter-
pretations, I choose to look at the consequences of what seems at first sight
to be a ‘non-standard analysis’ in the sociology of science. But to be
complete on that topic, I should have added that for the blind man of my
example, if things happened to move around him in curious ways, he
would probably attribute that to a playful friend playing tricks on him,
before thinking about ghosts, or any other non-standard agency . . . . In all
cases, however, he would apply the principle of sufficient reason: nothing
happens without a reason. And I am ready to bet on this anthropological
description of what he would do! The other comment I made on Picker-
ing’s TOE was, I think, also important, but was somehow made difficult to
read. I thus take the present opportunity to correct a sentence that
contained two important typos that made it incomprehensible. I noted that
by making his concepts applicable to everything, he was falling into an old
trap described long ago by Aristotle, that ‘there is an inverse relation
between the extension and the intension of a concept’ [YG, 326] – or, in less
philosophical terms, a notion applicable to everything is empty. But on this
Pickering has nothing to say.
Section five discussed what I saw as a ‘spontaneous breaking of
symmetry’ in Pickering’s treatment of humans and non-humans. On the
one hand, he writes that since he cannot attribute goals to non-humans,
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while he cannot make sense of scientific practice ‘without reference to the
intentions of scientists’, the symmetry between humans and non-humans
‘appears to break down’ [MP, 17]. In his Response, Pickering criticizes me
for effecting a ‘clean split between the human and the non-human’ [AP,
309]. Now, as any reader can see, it is Pickering himself in his book who
‘effects a clean split’ in giving intentions to scientists and refusing them to
objects which only react to human actions. My blind-man example took
that assymetry into account, so it is no surprise that it is not symmetrical.
By saying that my story of the blind man ‘invites us to think about how we
humans individually or collectively come to terms with a dead and unin-
teresting material world’ [AP, 309, emphasis added], Pickering is nearly
right – except that the little particle ‘and’ is here again creating confusion
by amalgamation: dead yes, but uninteresting no; objects are dead (exclud-
ing the living ones of course, which are not treated by Pickering) but very
interesting for scientists, as well as for historians and sociologists of science.
Instead of commenting on my being ‘traditional’ (curiously not seeing its
ironical tone), Pickering could have used space to explain why he is in fact
not symmetrical in his descriptions of actions, and why symmetry should
be expected a priori. Clearly, my comments meant that I was willing to be
enlightened on that apparent contradiction in the book: but, despite the
clear title of that section of my Review, Pickering does not seem to have
grasped the problem.3
This brings us to the section on individualistic history, which sug-
gested, again on the very basis of Pickering’s descriptions of events, that
compared to the original analysis of the bubble chamber and N/C technol-
ogy provided respectively by Peter Galison and David Noble, Pickering’s
treatment was turgid in style and fundamentally based on a very individu-
alistic treatment of action, which goes so far as stating (as, again, I noted in
my Review) that ‘scientific objectivity can be located already at the level of
individual practice . . . prior to any social ratification’ [MP, 196]. I then
noted that this view is hardly compatible with Pickering’s self-professed
pragmatism [YG, 330], but that does not seem to be a problem important
enough to be raised in his Response. When looked at from the point of view
of the general structure of the narratives proposed, it is plain that every-
thing in them is like a ping-pong game, be it between Morpurgo and his
apparatus, Glaser and his bubble chamber, or even between workers and
management. And it is significant that, as I noted in my Review, Pickering
admits that he could indeed have told the story of Morpurgo along the
same lines as he told the story of Glaser [MP, 72–73]. The problem was
not the absence of macrosociological actors, but the fact that they are all
treated similarly in a simple diadic relationship. But only a detailed
comparative treatment of the different narratives could show that convinc-
ingly, and the examples provided in my Review simply pointed the reader
in the right direction, so that s/he could easily find others.
We finally come to the last section, on resistance and constraint. Here
the point is not the inability to ‘imagine any alternative to . . . constraint
other than “total freedom” ’ [AP, 311, note 8], but to see how Pickering
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manages in his book to provide any alternative. It is true that he has
‘nowhere stated that contingency is all there is’ [AP, ibid.], but the book
clearly insists (like a mantra) that ‘things just happened’, and the only
concept used to limit total freedom is of course the ‘resistance’ of the
objects. But as I suggested in my Review with the example of Mozart [YG,
331], there are often social structures that play an important roˆle in
limiting possible actions. But here again, Pickering chose not to raise these
questions.
Pickering may be right that ‘the better arguments do not always win
the day’ [AP, 310], but they certainly have more chance of doing so when
their presentation is not too mangled and, above all, when their author
takes the time to answer competing arguments point by point by paying
attention to their precise formulation, instead of simply stating that the
original arguments were ‘hard to grasp’. But this is not an easy task when
one is contemplating one’s own oeuvre from the top of a mountain, while
looking down on those who tediously try to make sense of the bits and
pieces of arguments collected in a book and who, finding them wanting,
simply point to inadequacies, ready to be enlightened in their valley of the
blind.
Notes
1. Andy Pickering, ‘In the Land of the Blind . . . Thoughts on Gingras’, Social Studies of
Science, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 1999), 307–11 [hereafter ‘AP’]. For my Review, see Yves
Gingras, ‘The New Dialectics of Nature’, ibid., Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1997), 317–34
[hereafter ‘YG’].
2. His book, of course, is Andrew Pickering,The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and
Science (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995) [hereafter ‘MP ’].
3. Here is another example of the difficulty Pickering has in grasping an argument: he
writes that it is false to say, as I did [YG, 332], that he engages with straw opponents,
and mentions his ‘ten-page argument with David Bloor on SSK’ [AP, 310] as if I did not
mention that explicitly in my Review, when I wrote [YG, 321] that he criticized SSKers
for having excluded material resistance and limited themselves to social variables. Of
course, the difference comes simply from the fact that, while noting these specific
instances, I formulated a general statement [YG, 332], after having noted other
instances of false debates [YG, 322, 329 & 333, note 8].
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